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Although satellites have supported the military mission since the 
beginning of the space age, military uses of space have only recently become 
a suSject of concern in Congress and to the public at large. Three factors 
which have led to increased awareness of the military aspects of space are: 
the flights of the space shuttle, which will be used for military as well as 
civilian launches; increases in the budget for U.S. military space 
activities, so that it now surpasses that for civilian space activities; and 
the prospect of space-based weapons of either conventional or directed-energy 
design. 
This issue brief addresses policy issues related to the military uses of 
space, including the NASA/DOD relationship, funding levels for DOD space 
activities, and the perceived "militarization" of space. Civilian space 
policy issues are discussed in IB.82118, Space Policy and Funding: NASA and 
Civilian Space Programs. Additional issue briefs are available on specific 
topics: Star Wars: Antisatellites and Space-Based BMD, IB 61123; LANDSAT - 
Earth Resources Satellite System, IB 82066; Space Shuttle, IB 81175; Space 
Stations and Space Commercialization, IB 83147; and Commercialization of 
Landsat and the Weather Satellites, IB 83072. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
In addition to the more familiar space programs run by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the United States conducts an 
extensive military space program under the auspices of the Department of 
Defense (DOD). DOD satellites are used for a variety of functions, including 
reconnaissance (photographic, electronic, early warning, ocean surveillance, 
and nuclear explosion detection), communications, navigation, meteoroiogy, 
and geodesy. DOD is also developing an antisatellite (ASAT) device which 
will be able to destroy the operational capability of satellites in low earth 
orbit; the Soviets already have such a capability. Issues concerning ASATs 
are discussed in IB 81123. 
D O D t s  space budget is now greater than that of the total NASA budget 
(including aeronautics). For FY84, DOD received approximately $10.6 billion 
for space activities, compared to the $7.2 billion appropriated to NASA 
(including aeronautics) . 
DOD SPACE PROGRAMS 
DOD has developed a number of operational unmanned space systems as noted 
above, many of which have civilian counterparts. There are military and 
civilian communications, weat!-~er, and geodetic satellites, and the civilian 
seccor uses D O D t s  navigation satellite system. Civilian land remote sensing 
satellites (such as Landsat) are close relatives of military reconnaissance 
satellites. 
Until the space shuttle program, however, manned space activities were the 
province of NASA. Plans were developed for three manned military space 
programs, but all were cancelled prior to the fligh: test phase. The 
Dyna-Soar program would have involved a reusable manned s.pacecraft similar in 
principle to the space shuttle (but not as large). The program was cancelled 
in 1962 when DOD decided to pursue the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) 
program, which, as it name implies, would have developed a military space 
station. At the same time, plans developed for a "Blue Gemini" program, that 
is, the Air Force's adaptation of NASA's Gemini spacecraft for military use. 
The MOL program was cancelled in 1969 because DOD could not sufficiently 
jcstify the need for mannee space systems; Blue Gemini, which would have 
ferried crews to the MOL, suffered a similar fate. 
In the early 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  when NASA decided that it wanted to develop a reusable 
spacecraft, a policy decision was made by the Nixon Administration that this 
vehicle would serve all national requirements, military and civilian. Thus, 
DOD had a voice in the design of the space shuttle -- in determining, for 
example, the dimensions of the cargo bay so that it could accommodate DOD 
satellites. DOD agreed to construct a launch site for the shuttle at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base and to develop an inertial upper stage for getting 
spacecraft into higher orbits than are accessible by the shuttle. In return, 
NASA agreed to charge DOD a lower price for launching satellites via the 
shuttle for the first 6 years of operations. DOD's role in the shuttle 
program is discussed in the ISSUES section, and in IB81175. 
Launches of military satellites take place from either Cape Canaveral, 
Florida, or Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. As noted above, DOD is 
currently preparing a site at Vandenberg for launches of the space shuttle 
beginning in 1985. Those satellites which must be placed in very high 
inclination (polar) orbits will be launched from Vandenberg, whether they are 
DOD or NASA payloads. 
The primary control center for DOD satellites is the Satellite Control 
Facility in Sunnyvale, California. DOD is constructing the Consolidated 
Space Operations Center (CSOC) in Colorado Springs, Colorado to provide a 
more up-to-date and secure facility than the one at Sunnyvale. CSOC will 
ccnsist of two elements (with the possible addition of other elements if 
needed): the Satellite Operations Center (SOC) which will share che workload 
with Sunnyvale, and the Shuttle Operations and Planning Complex (SOPC) which 
will Control DOD shutcle missions and serve as back-up to NASA's shuttle 
control facility at johnson Space Center. The SOC portion of CSOC is planned 
to be operational by late 1986, with the SOPC reaching operational status in 
late 1987. 
DOD Organization for Space Activities 
Air Force. The Air Force acts as DOD's executive agent for space 
activities (although the Army and Navy also have cheir own space activities). 
In October 1981, the Air Force established a directorate of Space under the 
AF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Previously, space matters had been 
handled Only under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. 
The directorate provides a focus for space activities in an operational, 
rather than R&D, sense. 
On Cec. 8 ,  1981, Congressman Kramer Fntroduced H.R. 5130, a bill to change 
the name of the U.S. Air Force co the U.S. Aerospace Force, and to direct 
the Secretary of the U.S. Aerospace Force to submit to Congress a report on 
the desirability of creating a Space Command within the U.S. Aerospace Force. 
The Sili was referred to the Armed Services Committee and hearings were held 
May 19, 1982. 
CRS- 3 IS62117 UPDATE-05/04/84 
On June 21, 1982, the Air Force announcee that it would establish a Space 
Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, effective Sept. 1, 1982. The 
Space Command is headed by Gen. James v .  Bartinger, who retained his position 
as Commander in Chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD). AF Space Division (AFSC) in California continues to be a part of AF 
Systems Command, but AFSD's head is also Vice-Commander of Space Command, 
thereby establishing a wcrking relationship between the two. 
Space Commmand has assumed responsibility for weather and early warning 
satellites and other missile warning and spacecraft tracking devices, and 
will operate CSOC when it is completed. For the time being, however, other 
space activities will not be transferred to -Space Command. AF Systems 
Command will continue to have responsibility for AFSD, including the 
Satellite Control Facility at Sunnyvale, California. When operational, the 
NAVSTAR, MILSTAR, and ASAT systems will be .transferred to AF Space Command. , 
At the same time, the Air Force announced creation of a new Space 
Technology Center at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, under the direction of Systems 
Command. The new center reflects a realignment of Systems Command 
laboratories, and incorporates the AF Geophysics Lab, Rocket Propulsion Lab, 
and Weapons Lab. 
Navy. Navy Secretary John Lehman announced on June 15, 1983, that the 
Navy would form its own space command, designated NAVSPACECOM, effective Oct. 
1, 1983. The organization is headquartered at Dahlgren, Virginia, and 
reports to the Chief of Naval Operations. Among the organizations that are 
assigned to NAVSPACECOM are the Naval Space.Su.rveillance System located at 
Dahlgren, the Naval Astronautics Group at Point Mugu, California, and 
elenents which support the Fleet Sateliite Communications (FLTSATCOM) 
program. Former astronaut Capt. Richard Truly is head of NAVSPACECOM. 
Unified Space Ccmmand. Representative Kramer introduced H.R. 3073, the 
People Protection Act, on May 19, 1983. An identical bill, S. 2021, was 
later introduced by Senator Armstrong. Among the provisions in :he bills is 
the recommendation that a Unified Space Command be established to consolidate 
the space and strategic defense activities of all the Armed Forces into one 
operational command under the Zoint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force' submitted 
a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which reportedly voted in favor of 
establishing such an entity in November 1983, although no formal announcement 
has been made. 
U.S. MILITARY SPACE POLICY 
The division of the U.S. space program into separate military and civilian 
components was ordered by President Eisenhower because of his concern that 
the United States be perceived as pursuing peaceful applications of space. 
Although the Army had been developing tec?~nology which would later be used to 
launch the first U.S. satellite (Zxplorer) into orbit, Eisenhower would not 
permit the Army to use that technology for space purposes Until after the 
Soviet Union hae embarrassed the United States by placing the first satellite 
into orbit in October 1957, and after the civilian launch vehicle Vanguard 
had failed to successfully launch a satellite into orbit for the United 
States. 
Never~heless, Eisenhower was adamant that a separate civilian space agency 
be created, and this was accomplished in the 1958 National Aeronautics and 
Space Act (NASAct) which created NASA to conduct civilian space activities, 
while leaving military space programs under the jurisdiction of DOD. The 
Army team that developed rocker technology (the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency's Development Operations Division, headed by Werner von Braun) was 
transferred to NASA. 
President Carter's Directive on Eilitary/~ivil Space Relationships 
Throughout the 1960s and 19705, the space policy Contained in the NASAct 
remained ~ h e  basis for U.S. space programs. In 1978, President Carter 
reviewed national space policy to determine if any changes were required in 
light of the 20 years of space activities. Eis review culminated in two 
directives issued in 1978. The first of these, PD-37, addressed the 
relationship between U.S. military and civilian space programs. (The 
second concerned the civilian space program only, and is discussed in 
IB82118.) An unclassified fact sheet on PD-37 was released in July 1978. 
Questions had arisen over whether the two space programs should continue to 
be separate, or whether the division was creating an unnecessary duplication 
of capabilities and leading to funding competition between NASA and DOD. In 
addition, there were questions over utilization of the space shuttle: what 
would happen if a civilian payload was scheduled for launch but DGD 
unexpectedly had a requirement to launch a military payload; and would the 
security requirements for DGD operations compromise the open nature of NASA's 
program? 
Regarding the separation of the two programs, the PD-37 fact sheet state6 
that "the United States will maintain current responsibilities and management 
relationships among the various space programs, and, as such, close 
coordination and information exchange will be maintained among the spce 
sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication and to allow maximum 
cross-utilization of all capabilities." Concerning shuttle utilization, the 
directive said that :he space shuttle would provide "launch priority and 
necessary security to national security missions while recognizing the 
essentially open character of the civilian space program." 
PD-37 established a Policy Review Committee (Space) within the National 
Security Council to "provide a forum to all Federal agencies for their policy 
views, to advise on proposed changes to national space policy, to resolve 
issues referred to the Committee, and to provide for ra?id referral of issues 
to the President for decision as necessary." This committee was abolished at 
the end of the Carter presidency. 
President Reagan's Kilitary Space Policy 
On July 4, 1982, President Reagan released his space policy for bot3 
military and civilian programs. The first goal listed in the space policy 
directive was strengthening the security of the United  state.^. In other 
areas of military space activities, the new policy directive stated that 
survivability of space systems will Se pursued commensurate with =he threat, 
wich the planned use in crisis and conflict, and with the availability of 
other assets to perform the mission; and the United States will proceed with 
development of an antisatellite (ASAT) system 30th to deter threats and, 
"within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary the 
use of space-based systems chat provide support to hoszile military forces." 
The President stated in the directive that the military and civilian 
programs would continue to be separate entities, but outlined several 
guidelines for cooperation and coordination between the two. 
The directive also created a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on Space to 
provide a forum for all Federal agencies involved in space activities. The 
SIG (Space) is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National 
Security and includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of 
Commerce, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Administrator 
of NASA. Representatives of OMB and OST? are included as observers, and 
other interested agencies will participate based on the subjects to be 
addressed. 
The President announced the release of the directive at welcoming 
ceremonies for the crew of the fourth shuttle flight (the first to carry a 
military payload). Neither his speech nor the space policy directive 
addressed two items considered important by space program supporters: 
whether the country should procure a fifth shuttle orbiter and whether the 
country should place increased emphasis on developing a permanent manned 
presence in orbit (a space station). 
In August 1982, DOD released an unclassified fact sheet (based on a ' 
classified study) outlining DOD space policy. According to the fact sheet, 
DOD and NASA will continue to cooperate under existing agreements to carry 
out the terms of the President's July 4 space policy message, and DOD 
vrecognizesw the space shuttle as the country's primary launch system "and 
the need for the DOD to continue to cooperate with NASA efforts to develop a 
fully operational Space Transportation System." Regarding weapons in space, 
the fact sheet states that the development of an ASAT capability shall be 
continued "within such limits imposed by internationai law" and adds that DOD 
planning "emphasizes adherence to the existing international legal regime 
which pertains to spacew and that DOD will "consider verifiable and equitable 
arms control measures that would ban or otherwise linit the deployment of 
specific weapons systems should those measures be compatible with United 
States national security." According to the fact sheet, the new policy 
contains "no new directions in space weaponryw but only provides support for 
continued research and planning. 
On Mar. 23, 1983, in a televised address to the Nation, President Reagan 
noted that the United States had increasingly based its strategy of 
deterrence "upon the threat of retaliation." He then asked if it wouldn't be 
better if th'e United States could "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic 
missiles before they reach our own soil or that of our allies" instead. %e 
then announced that he would direct a "comprehensive and intensive effort to 
define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our 
ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles." 
According to press accounts, the White House had indicated prior to the 
speech that these references included the possibility of establishing a 
space-based b a l l i s ~ i c  missils defense system, although they cautioned that 
this was not necessarily an endorsement of the Yigh Frontier concept, and 
that the long-term R&D effort would include a wide array of potential 
technologies, including, Sut not limited to, lasers, particle beams, and 
microwaves. Issues related to this debate are discussed in IB 81123. 
HIGH FRONTIER PROJECT 
In March 1982, the High Frontier Project (then affiliated with the 
conservative Heritage Foundation) released a report entitled "High Frontier: 
A New National Strategy." Prepared under the direction of Lt. Gen. Daniel 
Graham (Ret.), former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the report 
outiined a new national strategy for defending the United States. According 
to Graham, it would mcve the country from its present strategy of Mutually 
Assured Destruction to Assured Survival. 
The program described in the report consists of eight interrelated 
systems, many of which involve the use of space: (i) a space-based ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) system using conventional technology, which would 
involve launching 432 satellites, each armed with 40-50 homing interceptors 
(a second generation BMD system based on laser technology is also mentioned); 
(2) a swarm jet point defense system for U.S. ICBM silos; (3) improved 
civilian defense; (4) improveme~ts to the space shuttle to shorten turnaround 
time and develop an unmannned version of the system; (5) development of an 
Orbital Transfer Vehicle for moving objects from one orbit to another; ( 6 )  
development of a manned high performance space plane (also referred to as a 
space cruiser or space jeep) for inspection/repair/reconaissance missions; 
( 7 )  an orbiting space station for both military and civilian uses; and (8) a 
prototype solar power satellite system for generating and transmitting 
electricity either to a space station or to Earth. 
According to the study, the entire program would cost $50 billion over the 
course of 10 years, but these estimates have been criticized as being too 
low. Another criticism is that deployment of a space-based BMD system using 
conventional technology would be contrary to the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES 
The Soviet Union conducts an extensive military space program. Since the 
Soviet space program is under the control of t9e Soviet Strategic Rocket 
Force, the argument is sometimes made that the entire program is military. 
In fact, the Soviets use space for essentially the same purposes as the 
United States, inciuding both civilian and military science and applications. 
m k  ,,,e Soviets do appear to place a greater emphasis on military applications of 
space; however, and have several military space systems which the United 
States does not. For example, the Soviets use space-borne radars for ocean 
surveillance, which reportedly allows them co track ships at sea, in adCiticn 
to the more common ocean surveillance spacecraft which intercept electronic 
signals. 
The Soviets have developed two weapons systems which involve the use of 
space (excluding ICBMs, which also reach into space for a short part of their 
trajectory). The first, called a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System 
(FOBS), is essentially an extremely lcng range ICBF which would reach the 
United States via a trajectory over the South Pole, thus avoiding North 
American early warning radars which point to the north. The FOBS warhead 
does not actually go into orSit, but is designed to complete slightly less 
than one orbit before being ordered down to impact its target on the surfacei 
No tests of the FOBS systems have beer! conducted since 1977, and opinion in 
the West is divided as co whether the tests scopped because the Soviets 
decided the system was not worthwhile, or because it is operational and 
therefore does not require further testing. 
The second space weapons system, an antisatellite (ASAT) device, is fully 
discussed in IB 81123. In brief, an intercepto'r spacecraft is launched into 
a co-orbit with the target satellite. The interceptor maneuvers close to 
the target and explodes, destroying the operational capability of the target 
with shrapnel. The Soviets have conducted 20 tests of this system since 
1968. 
It has been estimated that 60-70% of all Soviet launches each year are for 
purely military purposes, and another 15% are for joint military/civilian 
activities. Such distinctions are difficult to draw and are, to some extent, 
arbitrary. For example, it is difficult to distingush between military and 
civilian communications and navigation satellites. Nevertheless, the number 
of reconnaissance spacecraft launched by the Soviets each year (including 
early warning, ocean surveillance, etc.) does comprise a significant 
percentage of their annual space activity. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites remain in orbit 
for relatively short periods of time (either 2 or 6 weeks) and therefore must 
be replaced more often than their U.S. counterparts, which reportedly can 
remain in orbit for months or years. 
The Soviet Union is thought to be less reliant on space systems for 
command and Control functions than the United States (approximately 70% of 
U.S. overseas military communications are transmitted via satellite). 
Nevertheless, satellites do make up a significant part of its war fighting 
capability. The following categories of Soviet military satellites have been 
identified: photographic reconnaissance, early warning, radar ocean 
reconnaissance, electronic ocean reconnaissance, electronic ferreting, 
communications (including store/dump), geodesy, navigation, meteorology, 
minor military (including radar calibration), manned systems (involving 
military use of Salyut space stations), and weapons (antisatellites and 
FOES) . 
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES 
Other Launching Countries 
As more countries become able to launch satellites into space, they will 
also be able to launch military Satellites if they so desire. France, for 
example, which is the major C O n t r i b ~ t ~ r  to the Zuropean Space Agency's Ariane 
launch vehicle program, is considering placing a military reconnaissance 
satellite (called SAMRO) into orbit in the 1980s. Although the project was 
temporarily shelved in late 1982 because of budget Constraints, it has not 
been cancelled. Japan has also indicated interest in such satellites, 
although it would need U.S.. permission to place such a Satellite in orbit 
because of an agreement it signed with the United States in order to receive 
permission to manufacture launch vehicles based on U.S. technology. China 
already has orbited several spacecraft which are thought to be prototypes for 
reconnaissance spacecraft, and India may also develop such spacecraft. 
It shouid also Se noted that just as orbital launch vehicle technology ,in 
both the United States and Soviet Union developed from military missile 
technology, the reverse can also be true. Thus a country with the ability to 
launch spacecraft into orSit also possesses a significant long range missile 
cas- 8 
capability. 
United Nacions Involvement 
The U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was the forum 
in which two treaties (see below) were developed that restrict military 
activities in space and on the Moon and other celestial bodies. In addition 
to the COPUOS activities, the United Nations General Assembly has referred 
the topic of militarization of space to the Committee on Disarmament (CD). 
(Technically, the CD is not part of the U.N., but it has a close association 
with that organization.) 
In August 1962, COPUOS sponsored the Second U.N. Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACET82). One of the major 
issues discussed at the conference was the growing concern over increased 
military activities in space, and three paragraphs were included in the final 
report of the conference reflecting this concern. 
At its meeting in the fall of 1982, the CD .set aside one week of its 
deliberations for discussion of military space issues. Discussions are 
underway at the CD to establish a working group to deal with this issue. 
TREATIES RESTRICTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SPACE 
Several treaties exist which restrict the use of earth orbit, the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, for military purposes. The two treaties developed by 
COPUOS are the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty) which 
prohibits the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in 
orbit, and the 1979 Agreement Governing The Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Treaty) which prohibits the use of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies for any military activities including the 
testing or deployment of weapons (this treaty is not in force yet). 
In addition, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits the explosion of 
nuclear weapons in space, and the 1972 SALT I agreement bans the deployment 
of space-based antiballistic missile systems (except those based on "other 
physical principles" which are subject to further- discussion), and prohibits 
interference with "national technical means of verification," which 
presumably includes reconnaissance satellites. 
In 1981, the SoviPt Union introduced a draft treaty at the United Nations 
to ban all weapons from space, although it would not ban either the 
antisatellite system that has Seen tested by the Soviets since 1968 (since it 
is ground-based) or the one being developed by the United States (since it is 
air-Sased). A revised draft was introduced by the Soviets in August 1983 
which would San the use of force in space. It also calls for the 
dismantlement of existing ASAT systems, although the Soviets still have not 
admitted that they have such a device. Furthermore, the draft would ban the 
military use of manned spacecraft such as the space shuttle and Soviet space 
stations. 
THZ PEOPLE PROTECTION ACT 
On May 19, 1983, Representative Kramer and 11 co-sponsors introduced H.R. 
3073, the People Protection ACT. The bill would have Congress "encourage the 
President to implement those measures needed co protect people and to reduce 
dependence on nuclear retaliatory strategies." Among the provisions in the 
bill are recommendations to: establish a new agency to consolidate the 
directed energy development activities of the Armed Forces, DOD, and DOE; 
create a U ~ i f i e d  Space Command; establish a new command in the Army for 
ground-based strategic air defenses and ballistic missile defense, and to put 
that command under the Unified Space Command; transfer to DOD those space 
launch vehicles and associated elements that are necessary for the conduct of 
national military space activities; order the immediate development of a 
manned space station capable of supporting national security and other 
activities in space; and to assess (a) the role of strategic defenses as 
verification safeguards and enforcement mechanisms within current anC 
prospective arms control agreements, (b) the consistency of the 1972 ABM 
treaty with existing international legal conventions for the regulation of 
armed conflict, and (c) other organizational changes within the Government 
needed to implement the President's strategic recommendations. A press 
reiease accompanying the bill ciarified that the space launch systems 
referred to are those space shuttles which will be used for national security 
missions, and that NASA would be responsible for developing the manned space 
station. The bill was referred to the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and 
Science and Technology Committees. Hearings were held on Nov. 10, 1983, by 
the Armed Services Committee. An identical bill, S. 2021, was introduced by 
Senator Armstrong and referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
DOD SPACE EUDGET 
Unlike the NASA budget, which has remained essentially level 
except for increases due to inflation for the past several years, 
the DOD budget for space-related programs has grown considerably 
in recent years. The following table provides the FY83 and FY84 
appropriation levels for these programs and the FY85 request. 










Space Ground Support 
Supporting R&D 
General Support 
FY83 FY84 FY85 
Appro?- APProP - Request 
TOTAL 6,510.0 10,590.3* 12,912.7 
*DOD continues to revise its accounting for space activities, 
and now states that the FY84 request and appropriation was 
$10,590.3 million, instead of the $9,881.5 million reported 
earlier, or the $9,239.0 million reported before that. 
For FY83, DOD requested a total of $3.5 billion for space activities; 
Congress appropriated $8.51 billion. A breakdown by program area is provided 
in the preceding table. 
The DOD authorization bill was signed into law on Sept. 8 ,  1982 (P.5. 
97-252). Action was not completed on the DOD appropriation bill, so its 
provisions were incorpcrated into the FY83 Further Continuing Appropriations 
Bill (P.L. 97-377). The military construction authorization bill was signed 
into law on Oct. 15, 1982 (P.L. 97-321); the military construction 
appropriations bill became law the same day (P.L. 97-323). 
Space-Sased Laser Research. One of the most controversial issues in the 
DOD space budget in FY83 was what type of research to fund for development of 
space-based lasers (SBLs). DOD has focussed on chemical lasers, since they 
are further along technologically than alternatives, such as short wavelength 
lasers, that might be more effective SBLs. 
In its report on the DOD authorization bill (H.Rept. 97-4821, the House 
Armed Services Committee recommended that the chemical laser program be 
terminated and replaced with an expanded effort for short wavelength lasers. 
Conversely, the Senate Armed Services did not make any change to the SBL 
request when it reported the bill (S.Rept. 97-330). Also, during floor 
debate on the bill on May 13, 1982, an amendment was adopted directing DOD to 
produce an orbital laser weapons system "as quickly as technology will 
allow," although no funding was added for this purpose. 
The conference report (H.Rept. 97-479) on the authorization bill offered a 
compromise whereby both development programs were supported, although funding 
for the Air Force's program ($41 million) was denied. The Senate 
"reluctantly" agreed to delete the wording that it had adopted regarding an 
on-orbit demonstration. 
DOD Payments to NASA for Space Shuttle Launches. As discussed in IB81175 
- - Space Shuttle, Congress expressed concern during the FY83 budget process 
that DOD was not paying its full share of shuttle costs. DOD and NASA had 
reached an agreement in 1977 whereby DOD would pay less for each shuttle 
launch than non-DOD shuttle users for the first 6 years of shuttle operations 
because DOD was developing an upper stage for the shuttle and preparing a 
west coast launch site. 
At the time action was occurring on the FY83 DOD authorization bill, other 
congressional committees were calling for DOD to begin paying the same price 
as non-DOD users starting in FY33. The House adopted an amendment during 
floor debate on the DOD authorization bill on July 29 stating that DOD could 
not transfer funds to NASA for shuttle launch costs in excess of those 
amounts required by law and interagency agreements in effect as of July 1, 
1982. This language was incorporated in the final version of the bill. 
Since the actions Sy the other committees never Secame law, however, this 
provision is moot. 
Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC). The House and Senate 
Appropriations Commi=tees expressed concern that the computers that had been 
selected for CSOC were obsolete. The Senate committee reduced funding for 
CSOC in its report on the D O 3  appropriation bill by $8.7 million (S.Rept. 
97-580), while the House provided che full request of $32.1 million (K.Rept. 
97-943). In conference, agreement was reached whereby a middle level of 
iuneing was provided ($28 million), but the conferees stated that they sharee 
the concerns of the Senate and directed che Air Force to submit a report on 
CSOC's computer architectcre, with the possibility of reprogramming money for 
the facility after the report was received. 
Funding for CSOC was also included in the military construction bill 
($67.7 million) and this was approved without chanqe, although language was 
included in the appropriation bill directing a study not only of the computer 
systems, but also of right-of-way agreements for the land on which CSOC is 
being built. 
Vandenberg AFB Shuttle Launch Site. During action on the military 
construction bills, Congress expressed concern about the delays and rising 
costs associated with construction of a west coast launch site for the space 
shuttle at Vandenberg Air Force Base. 
The authorization bill provided full funding ($40 million) for 
construction of an environmental shelter for the shuttle at Vandenberg, but 
reduced funding for other facilities modifications from $26.5 million to 
$14.8 million. 
In its report on the bill (H.Rept. 97-7261, the House Appropriation 
Committee noted that the cost may rise from the original estimate of $252 
million to $882 million. While stating its concern that the funding already 
spent "may not result" in a "usable facility," the committee added that there 
probably was no alternative to completing the facility, and recommended steps 
to monitor costs and C O n ~ t r U ~ t i O n  more closely. The full request for the 
shuttle environmental shelter was approved contingent upon a review of final 
plans' and costs for the project,, but funding for other facilities 
modifications was cut by $4.3 million more than in the authorization bill (to 
$10.5 million). These actions were adopted in the final bill. 
For FY84, DOD requested $9.9 billion for space-related activities; 
Congress appropriated approximately that amount (final figures are not yet 
available), although in some cases funding within categories (such as lasers) 
was redirected. The DOD authorization bill was signed into law on Sept. 24, 
1983 (P.L. 98-94), and the DOE appropriation bill became law on Dec. 8, 1983 
(P.L. 98-212). The military construction authorization bill was signed into 
law on Oct. 11, 1983 (P.L. 98-115), and the military construction 
appropriation bill became law on the same day (P.L. 98-116). 
Directed Energy Research. Funding for laser research was again 
controversial, with Congress reiterating its concern that DOD was emphasizing 
chemical lasers instead of short wavelength lasers which hold more promise. 
In areas related to development of space-based lasers, DOD requested $36.i 
million for the Air Force Space Laser ?rogram, $82.5 million for the Air 
Force Advanced Radiation Technology Program (which includes the Airborne 
Laser Laboratory), $45 million for DARPA's High Energy Laser Technology 
program (including Teal Ruby), and $127.5 million for the DARPA Space Laser 
Triad program (Aipha, LODE, and Talon Gold). For particle beam weapons, DOD 
requested $33.1 million in the DARPA budget. Other funding for high-energy 
laser programs not specifically relazed to space-based lasers and for 
particle beam weapons was included in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and DARPA 
budgets, but is not discussed here other than to say that a total of $500 
million was apprcpriazed for all forms of directed energy research for all 
the services, of which $56 million was for particle beams, and $441 million 
was for high energy lasers (the remainder was for technologies such as pulsed 
power microwaves.) 
Congress denied all funding for the Air Force Space Laser Program, but 
created a new Air Force program called the Strategic Laser Systems Technology 
program for which $60 million was authorized, and $51.5 million was 
appropriated. For the Air Force Advanced Radiation Technology program, the 
authorization Sill deleted $20 million, terminating the Airborne Laser 
Laboratory program. The appropriation bill reduced that amount by another 
$10 million, for a total appropriation of $52.5 million. Of this amount, $28 
million is for space laser systems and $23.5 million for research into 
visible/ultraviolet laser technolgoy. (The House Armed Services Committee 
had recommended a separate line item of $80 million for the AF Space Command 
to study visibie/uv lasers, but this was not adopted.) Language was added 
stating that the $2-3.5 million could not be obligated until the Fletcher 
Commission report on strategic defense initiatives was completed. All 
requested funding for the DARPA laser and particle beam programs was 
approved, and $30 million was added for its High Energy Laser Technology 
program. 
Space Weapons Policy. Although Congress approved the $225 million 
requested for the U.S. ASAT program, of which $19.4 million was for 
procurement, language was added to both the authorization and appropriation 
bills requiring the President to take some sort of action on space arms 
control (these issues are discussed at length in IB81123). 
In the authorization bill, language was included which states that no 
tests of the U.S. ASAT cievice against space objects can be conducted until 
the President certifies to Congress (1) that he is endeavoring in gooC faith 
to negotiate a ban on ASATs with the Soviet Union, and (2) that in the 
absence of such a gan, such tests are necessary for national security. The 
langaage had been adopted unanimously by the Senate based on an amendment 
introduced by Senator Tsongas, and approved in the conference report on the 
bill, 
Three other amendments related to this topic were rejected. In the House, 
an amendment introduced by Representative George Brown to delete the 
procurement funding for the ASAT until Congress had more time to consider the 
implications of deploying ASAT weapons was defeated; R&D funding would not 
have been affected. Later, the House also rejected a Seiberling amendment 
which would have prohibited testing of the U.S. ASAT de.vice until expressly 
authorized by Congress. In the Senate, a Wallop amendment was defeated which 
sought to increase funding for space-based lasers and to place the program 
under the management of the Army instead of DARPA. 
During its consideration of the DOD appropriation bill, the House 
Appropriations Committee denied procurement funding for the ASAT program and 
required the President to submit an Unclassified report Sy Mar. 30, 1984, 
providing a comprehensive 3.S. policy on arms control in space. The House 
made no attempt to change the committee's recommendation, but the Senate did 
noc make a similar move. The conferees agreed to withhold the procurement 
money until the President submits an unclassified report outlining his policy 
on space arms control, which must be submitted no later than Mar. 31, 1984. 
Advanced Military Spaceflight Capability. Congress denied t3e $2.758 
million requested by the Air Force to study advanced systems for military 
manned space systems (such as space cruisers). 
Space Shuttle. Conqress approved the $559 million requested for the space 
shuttle in the DOE authorization and appropriation measures: $337.4 million 
for R&D, $195.3 million for procurement, and $26.847 for acquisition and 
activation of the Vandenberg shuttle launch site. In the military 
construction bill, however, there was disagreement over funding for specific 
items related to space shuttie facilities. In the military construction 
authorization bill, the House denied $6.6 million for construction of a 
shuttle external tank area icing protection facility at Vandenberg. The 
Senate approved the funding, and the conference report included the requested 
amount. In the military construction appropriation bill, the House deleted 
S700r300 requested for security modifications at NASA's Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) and $4 million of the $14 million requested for security modifications 
at Vandenberg, as well as the $6 million for the icing protection facility. 
The Senate approved all requested funding for these items. The conferees 
approved the icing protection facility, but adopted the House position on 
denying funding for security modifications at JSC, and approved $6 million of 
the $14 million requested for Vandenberg security modifications. 
Other Space Programs. Congress approved virtually all other requested 
funaing for space-related items in the DOD budget, including $335 million for 
NAVSTAR, $220 million for AFSATCOM, $158 million for the Defense Satellite 
Communications System (adding language to permit multi-year procurement for 
this system), $61 million for meteorological satellites, $123 million for 
FLTSATCOM, and $150 million for MILSTAR. Funding for the Integrated Tactical 
Surveillance System, which reportedly includes concepts for space-based 
radars with which to track ships, was reduced from $30.2 million to $12 
million becuase of congressional concern that many of the 'projects within the 
ITSS category had been separated out, and the ITSS program requires 
rescoping. 
The total amount requested by DOD for space activities in FY85 is 
$12,912.7 million, an increase of $2,322.4 million, or 22%, over the latest 
DOD assessment of its funding for space activities in FY84. The FY85 request 
includes $877 million for the St.rategic Defense Initiative. For specific 
programs, the following amounts are requested: antisatellite program, $226.3 
rni.llion; NAVSTAR, $435.8 million; Defense Satellite Communications System, 
$322.8 million; Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, $188.2 million; Air 
Force Satellite Communications program, $141.6 million; Fleet Satellite 
Communications system, $63 million; space launch support (upper stages), 
$301.8 mlllion; space boosters, $45.7 million. 
ISSUES 
1. The "Militar-zation" Of Space 
The growing interest in military activities in space is centered around 
the issue of whether or not space is becoming "militarized." All of the 
issues discussed below relate ,to that issue, but it should be noted that fhe 
definition of the term l'militarization of space" depends upon the situation 
in which it is used, and it is becoming more common to differentiate not 
between " ~ ~ i l i t a r y "  an8 "?eacefulM space activities, but I1aggressive" and 
"non-aggressive." 
Filitarization is often used to mean only the use of weapons in onter 
space, and in particular, advanced concepts of placing laser or particle beam 
weapons in space for use against satellites and/or ballistic missiles enroute 
to their targets. Devices to disable satellites already exist (the Soviet 
system is operational; the U.S. system is under development). These can be 
considered aggressive space activities, whether they are termed offensive or 
defensive weapons. 
In other contexts, however, the term "militarization" refers to all 
military uses of space, including :hose that are "non-aggressive" -- such as 
reconnaissance, navigation, weather, and communications -- which serve as 
force multipliers. Navigation satellites, for example, can be used to 
provide targeting information for submarine launched ballistic missiles. As 
a result, there have been suggestions to limit the availability of navigation 
Satellites to a short time each day such that ships and aircraft would still 
be able to determine their positions, but could not use them for targeting 
missiles. 
The utility of satellites as force multipliers, for command and control, 
and in a weapons context has prompted the concept of space as the new "high . 
ground," providing a vantage point for military commanders. This concept is 
embodied in the High Frontier proposal discussed earlier. The awareness of 
the critical role space systems might play in a crisis situation has led to 
measures to protect existing space systems (for example, the hardening of 
satellites to protect them from radiation and el.ectromagnetic pulse which 
might result from a nuclear explosion in space), and to proposals for new 
programs. The budget for DOD space activities has thus increased in recent 
years (see issue $4). 
2. DOD Contributions to the Space Shuttle Program 
The space shuttle is a national space transportation system., serving both 
the civilian and military communities. President Carter decided that NASA 
would be responsible for paying all development costs for the shuttle, while 
DOD is paying for construction of a West coasc launch site and for the 
inertial upper stage. In exchange, NASA and DOD negotiated an agreement in 
1977 whereby DOD would be charged a lower rate than other government agencies 
and-commercial users ($12.2 million per launch instead of $18 million (in 
1975 dollars) per launch) for the first 6 years of operation. 
During consideration of NASA's FY83 budget, ccncern was expressed by the 
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology, and Space that DOD was not paying its full share of shuttle 
costs, and directed DOD to pay full costs for shuttle launches beginning in 
FY83 (S.Rept. 97- 449). The Bouse had not made a similar provision in its 
version of the bill, and the compromise that was reached directs NASA to 
charge "such prices as necessary to recover the fair value" of placing DOD 
payloads in orbit (P.L. 97-324). 
In September 1982, NASA announced a new agreement whereby the price for 
DOD launches will increase to $16 million (i975 dollars) for launches in FY84 
and FY85, with the price rising to $29.8 million (1975 dollars) for FY86-88. 
According to the agencies, this is an equivalent price to that paid by 
non-DOD customers, taking into account the exchange of services at Cape 
Canaveral and Vandecberg. 
Duringhearings on the FY85 NASA budget by the House Science and 
Technology Committee, Air Force Undersecretary Edward Aldridge stated that 
while "DOD is fully committed to the STS, total reliance upon the STS for 
sole access to space . . .  could represent an unacceptable national security 
risk. DOD believes that a complementary system is necessary to provide high 
confidence of access to space." Thus, the Air Force announced that it woule 
continue to procure expendable launch vehicles (EVLs) in the future, which is 
in conflict with existing national policy which states that the space shuttle 
is to be the only launch system for Government payloads once it is 
operational. 
Other issues concerning DOD involvement in the shuttle program are 
discussed in IB 81175, Space Shuttle. 
3. The NASA/DOD Relationship 
The issue of the relationship between NASA and DOD in space activities has 
two facets. The first is whether or not the two programs duplicate each 
other, and in a time of constrained budgets, need to exist as separate 
entities. The arguments in favor of retaining separate programs focus on the 
open nature of NASA's activities compared with the classified natnre of DOD's 
work. There is concern that if the activities were merged, less information 
and technological spin-offs would become available to the nation at large, 
and that other countries might be less willing to participate in cooperative 
endeavors. There is also concern that military activities would overwhelm 
the civilian programs and scientific efforts (such as planetary programs and 
physics and astronomy) would be severely curtailed. Arguments in favor of 
combining the two focus on the cost effectiveness of reducing overhead costs 
and duplication of effort. Although President Reagan recently reaffirmed his 
policy of maintaining separate military and civilian space programs, with 
continued cooperation and coordination between the two, this continues to be 
a topic of considerable discussion. 
The other aspect of the debate concerns what some people view as the 
"militarization" of NASA, both in terms of the number of active or retired 
military personnel working at NASA, and the percentage of NASA programs which 
directly support military programs (both in space and aeronautics). A 1982 
report by the General Accounting Office (see REFERENCES) concluded that 20.5% 
of NASA's budget (primarily that for the space shuttle) directly supports 
DOD, with another 7.7% supporting joint civil/DOD activities. NASA contends 
that only a very small percentage of its funding (0.1%) directly .supports 
DOD, while a larger percentage (66.3%) supports joint civil/DCD activities. 
A November 1983 report by GAO ("Implications~ of Joint NASA/DOD 
Participation in Shuttle Operations," GAO/NSIAD-64-13) concluded that 
mechanisms were needed to better coordinate DOD/NASA interaction, supporting 
a recommendation by :he Office of Technology Assessment that consideration be 
given to reestablishing the National Aeronautics and Space Council in the 
White House. 
4. Increasing Budgets for DOD Space Activities 
The budget for DOD space activities has grown significantly in the past 
several years. In FY62, funding for DOD space activities exceeded chat for 
NASA's space activities for the first time ($6.4 billion versus $5.5 
billion). For FY83, the difference was even larger: $8.5 billion for DOD 
compared with $6.4 billion for NASA. (Figures for NASA do not include 
aeronautics.) For FY84, DOE received $13.6 billion for space, while NASA 
received approximately $6.7 billion for space activities. 
A number of studies are being performed on future military space 
activities, including manned systems such as space stations and 
quick-response space "cruisers" which could be launched from ~ h e  ground, air, 
or from the space shuttle. Zesearch is also underway on space-based lasers 
and particle beam weapons, although no decision has been reached on whether 
or not to deploy such syscems. Such programs are potentially expensive. 
In the fall of 1982, Air Force Under Secretary Aldridge was quoted as 
Saying that he expects the budget for military space activities to increase 
significantly over the next 5 years. He estimated that funding would 
increase by more than 10% each year above increases for inflation, to a total 
of $14 billion by FY8S (see New York Times article by Halloran in 
REFERENCES) . 
5. Proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency 
In 1978, the French Government proposed creation of an International 
Satellite Monitoring Agency in which the United Nations would use satellites 
to Verify adherence to international treaties in times of crisis, either 
based on data supplied by countries with reconnaissance satellites or from 
satellite (s) which the U.N. itself would own. A working group was 
established to develop details of such a plan, and its report was released in 
1982, but no further action has taken place. The United States does not 
support this proposal. 
LEGISLATION 
H.R. 5167 (Price) 
Authorizes appropriations to the Department of Defense for FY85. Reported 
from House Armed Services Committee on Apr. 19, 1984 (H.Rept. 98-691). 
H.R. 3073 (Kramer et al.)/s. 2021 (Armstrong) 
The People Protection 4c:. A bill to protect people and reduce dependence 
on nuclear retaliation strategies by establishing a new agency tc conauct 
directed energy technology research, creating a unified space command, 
transferring certain space launch vehicle (space shuttle) assets to the 
Department of Defense, and ordering the immediate development of a manned 
space station for nacionzl security and other space activities. Introduced 
in the House May 19, 1983; referred to Committees on Armed Services, Foreign 
Affairs, and Science and Technology. Hearings held by House Armed Services 
on Nov. 10. Introduced in the Senate on Oct. 28; referred to Senate Armed 
Services Committee. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/10/83 -- House Armed Services Committee held hearings 
on the People Protection Act. 
10/01/83 -- The Navy estabiished its own Space Command, 
headquartered at Dahlgren, Virginia. 
08/22/83 --  The Soviet Union introduced a revised draft 
treaty at the United Nations to ban the use 
of force in space. 
05/19/83 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings on space weapons. 
05/02/83 --  Senate Armed Services Committee held 
hearings on sp.ace weapons. 
04/14/83 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings on space wea?ons. 
03/23/83 --  President Reagan gave a nationally televised address 
in which he announced a study effort to determine 
what type of R & D  should be performed on ballistic 
missile defense systems. Presidential advisors 
explained that this coulC include space-based 
weapons, leading the media to dub this the "Star 
Wars" speech. 
03/23/83 --  House Appropriations Committee held hearings 
on the role of the military in space. 
09/20/82 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on military 
uses of space, focusing on space weapons. 
09/01/82 --  Air Force established a Space Command, headed by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD), in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado. 
09/10/62 -- U.N. Committee on Disarmament completed its 1982 session. 
No agreement was reached on whether to establish 
a working group to deal with the issue of 
militarization of space. 
08/09/82 -- The two week UNISPACE conference began in Vienna, Austria. 
A major topic of discussion was military uses of 
space. 
07/04/82 --  The fourth test flight of the space shuttle (the first to 
carry a DOD payload) was successfully completed. 
President Reagan welcomed the crew back, and 
announced his new space policy for military and 
civilian programs. 
05/19/82 --  Hearings held Sy House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 5130, 
concerning establishment of an Aerospace Force 
and a Space Command. 
03/04/82 -- The High Frontier project released its study on devising 
a new national strategy for defense, focusing on 
the utilization of space as the "high ground." 
10/01/81 --  Beginning of fiscal year 1982, the first year that DOD'S 
budget for space activities surpassed that for 
NASA's space activities. 
06/19/78 --  Presiden: Carter's space policy for military and Civil 
programs was announced in a fact sheet released 
by the White House. 
07/29/58 --  The National Aeronautics and Space Act was enacted into 
iaw, creating the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration to conduct civilian space activities, 
and leaving military space activities under the 
jurisdiction of DOD. 
01/31/58 - -  First U.S. satellite (Explorer) was launched using 
Army-developed missile technology. 
i0/04/57 --  World's first satellite, Sputnik 1 ,  was launched Sy the 
Soviet Union. 
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